Abstract
1. According to R. J. Wallace in Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, when we ask whether X is morally responsible for some bad act A, we are asking whether X is blameworthy for A. And when we ask whether X is blameworthy for doing A, we are asking whether it would be morally fair to blame him for it. Within this framework, traditional skeptical theses about responsibility become normative claims about the fair distribution of the moral sentiments. In particular, incompatibilism about responsibility becomes the view that if determinism is true, it is never morally fair to blame people for what they do. One of the main purposes of Wallace's book is to argue against incompatibilism so conceived.
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