The Case for Empathy: A Developmental Perspective

Abstract

Batson and Shaw develop a provocative and persuasive argument for a pluralism of motives for prosocial behavior, resulting from altruistic, as well as egoistic, concerns. In this view, altruistically based prosocial behaviors are motivated, at least part, by empathic concern for the welfare of another being. Altruistically based motivation may elicit egoistic motives as well. This does not eliminate or contaminate the altruistic motive, they reason, but does complicate the relationship between the two. For both empathy-based altruism and egoistically motivated altruism, the individual performs a hedonic calculus before acting, seeking the least costly means to the goal of reducing distress another. A series of elegant and rigorous studies with young adults have been conducted, suggesting that under some conditions, prosocial behavior may be grounded, part, on empathic concern. Batson and Shaw's argument rests on the ability to demonstrate (a) the independent existence of empathy-based prosocial behavior and, hence, (b) the possibility that prosocial behaviors are not invariably motivated by desire for reward, fear of punishment, or the need to reduce self-experienced aversive arousal response to the distress of another. A recent review article based on an expanded meta-analysis of studies, fact, supports Batson and Shaw's claims, yielding no evidence for the aversive-arousal hypothesis (Carlson & Miller, 1987). Moreover, even casual observation suggests prosocial actions often do appear to be so far removed from reward and punishment contingencies, that for all practical purposes they would appear to be driven by more intrinsically based motives. If Batson and Shaw's argument is to be given serious consideration, compelling evidence is needed to indicate that altruism motivated by empathy is an ultimate goal. Yet the current article does not directly address the critical question of how empathy is operationalized. Examination of the work of Batson and his colleagues indicates two basic approaches: (a) Empathy is measured via self-report (which raises questions about self-presentation and social desirability the reporting of some subjects) and (b) empathy is induced in the moment (e.g., by telling subjects about the plight of another person who is like themselves). Such manipulations of perceived similarity not only have a forced quality, but could also be interpreted as leading to egocentric, narcissistically based prosocial actions (I can only care about your needs because you are like me and I care about myself). The veracity of Batson's measures would be more persuasive with evidence of convergent validity-for example, if they related to independent assessments of particular emotions expressed and experienced by research subjects during another's distress. There is mounting evidence that psychophysiological measures will be increasingly informative this regard. Investigators have begun to distinguish different autonomic patterns for aversive arousal or personal distress (heart-rate acceleration) and sympathetic distress (heart-rate deceleration) response to another's distress (Eisenberg et al., 1989). Wiesenfeld, Whitman, and Malatesta (1984) differentiated highand low-empathy women on the basis of emotional and physiological responsivity to infant signals and different values about caregiving behavior. Even if measurement of empathy is improved, it will probably still be possible to construct plausible, post hoc alternative interpretations of data that reduce observed empathiclike behaviors to potentially self-serving acts. But just as Batson's position cannot be fully proven, neither is there convincing evidence from proponents of the egoistic hypothesis that all behaviors are motivated by self-interest. The concepts of human nature under debate are just that-mental constructions that, the final analysis, may not be fully amenable to empirical scrutiny. At the same time, I risk arguing that a still more persuasive case can be made for our potential as caring and committed creatures. To do so, the theoretical focus and research enterprise needs to be broadened to include (a) naturalistic as well as experimental data, (b) observations of children as well as adults, and (c) consideration of empathy as a capacity humans may potentially share with other mammals and that derives initially from family life. The evidence continues though, necessarily, to be imperfect. Research by Batson and his colleagues has focused on conditions that determine young adults' potential willingness to help unfamiliar others highly controlled, constrained, structured environments. This may limit analyses of empathy to those aspects that are more planful, reasoned, and goal oriented. This nondevelopmental approach bypasses the affective origins of empathy and the question of how humans