The Case Against Granting a Secret Ballot to Elected Representatives: Democratic-Theoretical Reflections on a South African Controversy

Abstract

ABSTRACTMany critics of President Zuma’s government argued that it was constitutionally and democratically permissible for Members of Parliament to vote secretly in motions of no confidence in the Executive. The Constitutional Court agreed, interpreting the Constitution as empowering the parliamentary Speaker to authorise a secret ballot no-confidence vote and seemingly encouraging her to rule in favour of one. This article argues against secret ballots in parliamentary votes, but on democratic-theoretical rather than constitutional-legal grounds. While a secret ballot is appropriate for voters, elected representatives have no right to conceal their voting choices. The absence of direct election of individual MPs in a given electoral system does not negate the requirement of accountability to voters. Moreover the system of party mandate, whatever its merits, is not democratically indefensible. Representatives ought to account to citizens for their voting choices either directly or indirectly via mandate-bearing parties. Further, a parliamentary secret ballot could be employed against those seeking executive accountability.