The Cartel Model and Motions for the Agenda: Israel as a Case Study (2003-2009)

Abstract

(ProQuest: ... denotes formula omitted.)During the last four decades, political scientists have posited various theories to explain the functioning of party systems and the evolutionary changes that take place in them. Descriptions of several types of parties have emerged from these theories including the elite party, the mass party, the catch-all party and the cartel model. Cox and McCubbins (2005) used the cartel model, originally devised by Katz and Mair (1995), to advance a theory about American political parties. They tested this theory by using the roll rate to measure the influence of each party. This paper uses the measurement of Cox and McCubbins' cartel theory in order to expand our knowledge about the ability of Israeli governments to set their agenda.Scholars argue that political parties evolve by becoming increasingly elitist and less ideological, and are dominated by money and professionals (e.g., Hopkin and Paolucci 1999; Panebianco 1988). In contrast, the mass party has an extensive organization and membership. Its main goal is to capture control of the state in order to expand the right to vote and enact social reforms that benefit its members (Duverger 1954). Similarly, the main goal of the catch-all model is to attract as many voters as possible (Kirchheimer 1966). Regardless of their goals, however, many political scientists believe that political parties are in decline.Katz and Mair (1995) disagree with this assessment. They argue the political parties have successfully adjusted to their present situation by forming cartel party systems, the next stage in party evolution after the mass and catch-all parties (Katz and Mair 1995). They use the term 'cartel' to describe the influence the party uses over the state to establish its own position in power by preventing others from entering the cartel.Since 1 995 there have been a wide variety of papers published in response to Katz and Mair' s cartel theory. Some of the works criticized it from a theoretical perspective (Kitschelt 2000; Koole 1996), some developed the theory (Blyth and Katz 2005; Katz and Mair 1996). Others have examined the theory using various countries as case studies (e.g., Bowler, Carter and Farrell 2003; Hopkin 2003; Pelizzo 2007; Yishai 2001; Young 1998). Cox and McCubbins (2005) later used the phrase 'cartel party' to advance a theory about American political parties they described as 'procedural cartels'. In their model the majority party in the House of Representatives acts as a cartel by controlling the key positions of power in the chamber and, by extension, the content and composition of the legislative agenda.Of what use are the procedures described by Cox and McCubbins and to what extent do they exist in other parliamentary bodies besides the American Congress? To answer these questions, we reviewed the major research on these procedures. First we established that parliaments worldwide have different procedures that serve the same purpose: blocking or delaying the ability of the opposition or the coalition to set its agenda. In the US Congress, blocking tactics including the use of the 'killer amendment' (Wilkerson 1999) can be used to make a bill fail. In the Israeli parliament (the Knesset), such a tactic is called the 'arrangement law', which allows the government to veto expenditure bills after they have been passed (Akirav, Cox and McCubbins 2010). France's National Assembly also has delaying tactics called the 'package vote' (Huber 1992). In Western and Eastern European parliaments such actions are called the 'successive procedure' (Rasch 2000). In sum, different parliaments have a variety of blocking and delaying tactics that they use to try to maintain a delicate balance between the power of the coalition or the majority party and the power of the opposition.In order to understand the effectiveness of the procedures, we must assume, as does Huber (1992), that institutional arrangements play important roles in structuring not only the relationship between the legislative and executive branches, but also the strategic interactions between the parties that are partners in coalitions, and between the government and the opposition parties in a minority government (Huber 1992:684-685). …