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Abstract
Approaching the 1989–93 Cambodian peace process from the Khmer Rouge point of view, this article explores how the group's nature, history and ideology conditioned its unco‐operative response and tactics towards United Nations intervention. It observes that the Khmer Rouge, once it realized it could not manipulate the structures of the peace process to the benefit of its own aspirations, adopted a two‐track policy. It remained outside the peace process, awaiting the withdrawal of the UN, preserving its military potential to take power afterwards. At the same time, it attempted to retain its international and domestic support despite its non‐co‐operation, by accusing UNTAC of subverting the Peace Agreements. Finally, the article explores how UNTAC was able to salvage the peace process despite the best efforts of the Khmer Rouge.
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