The Calendar Paradox

Abstract

In this paper I present an underappreciated puzzle about intention. The puzzle is analogous to the famous Preface Paradox for belief, and arises for any theory according to which intentions are all or nothing states governed by two popular and plausible rational norms. It shows that at least one of these three assumptions must be substantially revised, and thus that many standard views about intention cannot be true. I consider two general strategies for responding to the puzzle. The more conservative approach retains the assumption that intentions are all or nothing states, and attempts to marshal independent arguments for modifying one of the two puzzle-generating norms. I briefly discuss this line of response and conclude that there is prima facie reason to reject the more commonly defended of the two, the Consistency norm, which requires a particular relationship between one’s intentions and one’s beliefs about those intentions’ execution. I then explore a more radical approach: a solution that parallels the well-known partial belief response to the Preface Paradox. According to this solution, the puzzle about intention ultimately derives from the mistaken thought that the paradigmatic conclusions of deliberation are fully committed states of intention. Instead, I suggest that what we call intentions, and think of as all or nothing states, may in fact often be only partially committed states, which I call states of inclination, and which must be governed by slightly different norms. In addition to showing that my theory of inclination may give us a motivated way out of the puzzle, I provide independent arguments for thinking that we have such mental states, and I say what I can about their nature and the norms that regulate them. These arguments do not depend on the viability of the more radical response to the puzzle. They purport to show that inclinations are psychologically real, and that countenancing them is necessary for vindicating plausible descriptive and normative truths about mental phenomena.