Abstract
The Calculus of Consent, with its prescient subtitle 'Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy', initiated the study of constitutional political economy by introducing the conceptual distinction between constitutional and postconstitutional levels of collective choice. From this perspective particular policy outcomes are treated as being more or less a 'natural' product of people pursuing their interests through political processes, as this pursuit is shaped and constrained by constitutional rules. Undesirable or inefficient outcomes, then, call for constitutional remedy and not for exhortation to do better, to elect more qualified officials, to be less human, or to follow other similar nostrums.
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