The Burundi Peace Negotiations: An African Experience of Peace–making

Abstract

Contemporary peace negotiations in Africa reflect perceived changes in the nature of warfare in the post-Cold War, neo-liberal era. ‘New wars’ are characterised as predominantly civil warfare that is non-ideological, fuelled by identity-politics and driven by greed or grievance. Neo-liberal approaches to conflict resolution involve a multiplicity of state and non-state actors, both protagonists and mediators, and promote universally-applicable solutions, such as power-sharing and the extension of market-based economic systems. These have had limited success in Africa because they have been unable to transform the social system within which violence and inequalities are embedded. Through an examination of the Burundi peace process, particularly, the Arusha peace negotiations – their origins, actors, debates, agreements and recommendations – this article highlights the discursive practices of neo-liberal peace-making and exposes its inherent limitations in creating any meaningful transformation of the political space. It is argued here that peace negotiations can be perceived as political struggles, beyond that envisaged between the belligerents, due to the prevalence of a multitude of supporting actors seeking to promote vested interests. Consequently, the resulting peace agreement is not necessarily consensual or reflective of a compromise for the sake of peace; it marks, essentially, a temporary stalemate in the power play between international, regional and local actors and their competing visions of peace. This explains why the ‘liberal’ peace that is attained through these manoeuvrings is one that appears to uphold the sovereignty of the state, but is not transformative with regards to the security of the people.