Abstract
Korean democratization began in 1988, but by the early 1990s had failed to bring tranquility to the streets or to replace protest with institutionalized political participation. Using data taken from daily Korean sources for 1990 and 1991, I analyze the intimate interaction between coercion and protest. I apply the Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model to test competing hypotheses explaining the interaction. Regarding national protests in general, the results demonstrate that protests and coercion are closely and dynamically related. Unexpectedly, results show that, overall, protests do not necessarily decrease with coercion but do when no coercion at all is applied. My analysis also uncovers variation in the dynamics of state coercion and protest according to types of dissident groups. Of the groups assessed, workers were particularly active in protest. Farmers were the least active, and the Korean regime responded with the least repressive approach toward them. These findings emphasize the importance of daily subnational data. They also show how dynamic analytical models can improve our understanding of the protest-repression relationship.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
