The British Program for the "Reconstruction in Europe" in 1922: Political and Diplomatic Aspects

Abstract

The article examines the process of formation of the British program for the "reconstruction of Europe" and the diplomatic efforts of Prime Minister D. Lloyd George to promote it on the eve and during the Genoa Conference of 1922. The Conference was one of the key events of European diplomacy between the two world wars. In 1922, thirty four nations met to restore peace between victors and vanquished, reestablish ties between Soviet Russia and the West, and promote the economic reconstruction in Europe. The relevance of the problem under study is due to the controversial assessments of the Genoa Conference in modern foreign and domestic historiography. Considering the content of these discussions, the authors of the articles proceed from the fact that Lloyd George proposed to hold a major economic and political conference to re-energise the European economy and revive the flagging fortunes of his coalition government. He believed that if Russia was opened to world trade, this would enable Germany to prosper and pay reparations to Britain and France, who could then repay their American war debts. Germany's agreement with the new principles of relations with the winners would abate France’s security fears, thus contributing to the stabilization of the Versailles world order. However, the British program was not implemented, because Soviet Russia and Germany concluded the Treaty of Rapallo. Analyzing the reasons for the failure of D. Lloyd George, the authors come to the conclusion that they stem from the basic contradiction between the large-scale plan and the diplomatic miscalculations made by the British delegation on the eve and during the conference.