Abstract
TARIFF preferences involve a compromise between free trade and protection. They cannot exist where there is absolute free trade, nor where protection is rigidly applied for the sole benefit of the producers in the country under the jurisdiction of the tariff-making body. When tariff preferences were given by Great Britain in favor of Canadian grain and flour, before the repeal of the Corn Laws, they were really in the nature of mitigations of the Corn Laws, for the purpose of giving cheaper food to the people of Great Britain, as well as out of consideration for colonial interests. In this respect the motive was not unlike that which led to the
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