The Boundaries of Human Rights: The Problems with a Human Right to Political Membership

Abstract

In the Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt pointed out what she called the of human which became apparent in the interwar period when millions of refugees lost their citizenship and, at the same time, found themselves in a condition of rightlessness. This was paradoxical because human rights were supposed to be those rights that we have independent of our political status. Moreover, the authority of the national state, since the French Revolution, was based on the idea that it was the embodiment of the 'Rights of Man'. But since the national state was responsible for protecting the rights of its citizens, the only people who could expect to enjoy the benefits of human rights were those that were solidly incorporated into a national state. As soon as one found oneself without nationality - a human being as such - one found oneself in the condition of rightlessness. The paradox is therefore that human rights authorize national rights which cancel out human rights.Interestingly, a similar paradox has been raised within democratic theory. As Frederick Whalen and others have pointed out, the problem of determining the boundaries of the democratic state raises a paradox as well - we cannot determine who participates in political decisions using democratic means. Democratic theorists tend to believe that political communities should be constituted in a manner consistent with democratic principles but it turns out that there must be a preexisting political community before a democratic decision can be made.In this paper, I will argue that Arendt's paradox of human rights is related to the boundary paradox in that both arise when the principle of justification of political authority is the same principle that determines the boundaries of the community. In both cases, expulsion from the community denies all the benefits conferred by the community. Whelan argued that the boundary paradox shows that we cannot see democracy as the sole foundation of legitimate government and that we need to moderate some of the claims that are made in its name. Like the idea of democracy, respect for human rights have been presented by contemporary human rights theorists such as John Rawls as basis upon which states may claim the right of non-intervention. In effect, Rawls and other liberals such as Joshua Cohen and Charles Beitz base legitimate political power in the international system on the respect for human rights. By connecting the debate around the boundary paradox in democratic theory to Arendt's thoughts on the paradox of human rights, I will argue that we need to moderate our expectations of human rights as well and recognise that while they may serve to protect individuals, they cannot serve as a philosophical justification for political authority.