Abstract
In their paper “The Borda rule and Pareto stability: a comment” published in 1979 by Econometrica, Farkas and Nitzan revealed the “intimate relationship” between the Borda rule and the Pareto criterion. The idea was the following: in a profile of total orders, when there is a candidate who obviously wins under unanimous agreement of the voters, that candidate should be in the choice set. In a profile where there is no obvious winner, the candidates that are the closest to unanimity should be chosen. According to this principle, they defined a choice rule called “closeness to unanimity” and they showed that it is equivalent to the Borda rule. In our paper, we give an equivalent result for a ranking rule. Then we try to obtain similar results when aggregating profiles of tournaments, weak orders, semiorders, fuzzy relations, … and we show that the definition of an obvious winner is no more obvious.
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