Abstract
This research examines whether an alternative exchange rate policy could have mitigated Germany’s recession from April 1930 to May 1932, when Heinrich Brüning was Reichskanzler of the Weimar Republic. Using an open-economy dynamic model as our analytical framework, we examine the arguments against adopting the devaluation policy. Our counterfactual analysis suggests that a widely held belief—that floating the Reichsmark would have led to high inflation—is unwarranted. Despite Germany’s high foreign debt, floating the Reichsmark would have led to less of a decline in both real GDP and employment for the country during the Great Depression.
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