The Board of Directors in Bank Governance in China

Abstract

Putting together the puzzles from all the previous chapters, this chapter starts to explore and explain how the discourses of legitimacy and paradigm, as discussed in Chaps. 3, 4, 5, and 6, are manifested in the specific governance structure in Chinese banks. Reflecting on the production of the board of director in generic corporations then banking organizations, the chapter studies specifically the organization and behavior of the board of directors in Chinese banks, which embraces the orientation of the bank board, its composition, the board size and its independence. Illustrating the hybrid nature of the paradigm discourses of the enhanced shareholder primacy and diversified stakeholder theory and relevant legitimacy discourses, the board of directors in Chinese banks are observed to be heavily guided toward sustainable profitability to the shareholders, active support for economic development, and balance of interests of various stakeholders. Similar representation of discourses of legitimacy and paradigm is demonstrated in the board composition, the board size, and the board independence in Chinese banking industry.