The Bigger They are the Harder They Fall: The Link Between Economic Sanctions and Integration

Abstract

Economic sanctions, or deliberate financial and trade restrictions placed on a target state, remain an important yet controversial foreign policy tool used to achieve a set of pre-specified political or economic objectives. Conventional wisdom holds that the effectiveness of economic sanctions is contingent upon the degree of economic pressure imposed on the target-nation state. This claim, I argue, relies on the assumption that a target nation-state is integrated in the global economy. Nation-states with higher levels of economic integration are engaged in and are dependent upon higher levels of international trade. As such these states would have greater difficulty in economic adjustment if their trade was hindered. Expecting this difficult economic adjustment, target nation-states are more likely to capitulate, resulting in a successful economic sanction. Using an OLS regression this study finds that economic sanctions are more effective in target nations with higher levels of economic integration.