Abstract
Anthropological evidence from diverse societies suggests that prestige-based leadership may provide a foundation for cooperation in many contexts. Here, inspired by such ethnographic observations and building on a foundation of existing research on the evolution of prestige, we develop a set of formal models to explore when an evolved prestige psychology might drive the cultural evolution of n-person cooperation, and how such a cultural evolutionary process might create novel selection pressures for genes that make prestigious individuals more prosocial. Our results reveal (i) how prestige can foster the cultural emergence of cooperation by generating correlated behavioural phenotypes, both between leaders and followers, and among followers; (ii) why, in the wake of cultural evolution, natural selection favours genes that make prestigious leaders more prosocial, but only when groups are relatively small; and (iii), why the effectiveness of status differences in generating cooperation in large groups depends on cultural transmission (and not primarily on deference or coercion). Our theoretical framework, and the specific predictions made by these models, sketch out an interdisciplinary research programme that cross-cuts anthropology, biology, psychology and economics. Some of our predictions find support from laboratory work in behavioural economics and are consistent with several real-world patterns.
Highlights
Ethnography suggests that prestigious individuals generate cooperation, influence group decisions and provide informal leadership in a wide range of societies [1]
Our results reveal (i) how prestige can foster the cultural emergence of cooperation by generating correlated behavioural phenotypes, both between leaders and followers, and among followers; (ii) why, in the wake of cultural evolution, natural selection favours genes that make prestigious leaders more prosocial, but only when groups are relatively small; and (iii), why the effectiveness of status differences in generating cooperation in large groups depends on cultural transmission
Motivated by empirical patterns of leadership observed across diverse societies and by recent work on the evolution of prestige, we have developed a set of culture–gene coevolutionary models that explore the conditions under which the existence of prestige-biased cultural transmission can favour both the cultural evolution of cooperation and the genetic evolution of prosocial proclivities in prestigious leaders
Summary
Ethnography suggests that prestigious individuals generate cooperation, influence group decisions and provide informal leadership in a wide range of societies [1] These individuals often derive their prestige from superior skill, knowledge or success in locally valued domains, including domains related to social norms and rituals. Radcliffe-Brown identified a cluster of traits that seemed to give some individuals—usually one in each group—particular influence in their communities These traits, including both skill or knowledge in a locally valued domain and an unusual level of prosociality, attracted less prestigious individuals who willingly paid deference to this high status person, and seemed to desire just to hang around them. As we demonstrate formally below, when cultural learning is important, the information-goods form of prestige can provide a potent mechanism to generate both cooperation in followers and generosity in high status individuals.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
More From: Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.