Abstract
AbstractTransformations in state violence are intimately associated with technological capacity. Like previous era-defining technologies, global digital networks have changed state violence. Offensive cyber capabilities (OCCs) appear to constitute a major technological development that offers the potential for reducing state violence. This article asks: are OCCs really the better angels of our digital nature? Current scholarship in strategic studies, adopting a narrow definition of violence, conceives of OCCs as largely non-violent. This ignores how technology has given rise to new forms of harm to individuals and communities, particularly in the context of violent state repression. We propose using an expanded definition of violence, including affective and community harms, and argue that OCCs relocate, rather than reduce, state violence towards non-bodily harms. Even though their lethal effects are limited, OCCs are not, as is supposed, a non-violent addition to state arsenals. This conclusion has important implications for international affairs, including re-orienting defensive cybersecurity efforts and altering calculations around the perception of OCCs by adversaries.
Highlights
State violence has changed radically since the emergence of states in their modern form
Gartzke focuses on the potential of ‘the Internet to carry out functions commonly identified with terrestrial political violence’, rather than the question of whether those functions would be violent if carried out over the Internet.[51]
The transformation and reinvention of state violence has continued into the digital age
Summary
State violence has changed radically since the emergence of states in their modern form. The concept of potency asks whether cyber weapons are efficacious or powerful, not whether they are violent.[48] More recent work by others along these lines examines ‘dangerous’ instability rather than explicitly considering violence.[49] This movement away from violence is most explicitly made by Gartzke, who suggests that Rid’s definitional debate ‘risks becoming a purely academic exercise’ if cyberwar fulfils the same strategic logic as traditional war.[50] Gartzke focuses on the potential of ‘the Internet to carry out functions commonly identified with terrestrial political violence’, rather than the question of whether those functions would be violent if carried out over the Internet.[51] He addresses conceptual issues of damage and harm only briefly, arguing that cyberwar is less effective because damage is temporary, and its use degrades capabilities, so it should remain adjunct to terrestrial force.[52] Following this debate, the concept of violence is used rarely by strategic studies scholars.
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