The best among the connected (men): promotion in the Russian state apparatus

Abstract

ABSTRACT Bureaucratic promotion criteria create powerful incentives that shape the behavior of bureaucrats, governance, and regime legitimacy. Yet informal rules governing the functioning of the state apparatus are notoriously hard to uncover in authoritarian settings. Using a unique survey of Russian regional and municipal bureaucrats with an embedded conjoint experiment, I explore the criteria used for promotion decisions. I discover that personal connections to the future supervisor are a major favorable factor for bureaucratic promotions in Russia. For candidates with such ties, education and experience add extra advantage. Importantly, gender plays a crucial role; gender bias cannot be compensated by better education, experience, or a specific family strategy – and it is men with informal ties who drive the effect of personal connection on promotions. The study highlights the complex interaction between formal and informal criteria within Russian bureaucracy and contributes to our understanding of post-Soviet neopatrimonial politics.