Abstract
More than a hundred years ago, the first models of oligopolies were described. Modeling of oligopolies continues to this day in many modern papers. The main approach meets the concept of the Nash equilibrium and is actively used in modeling the behavior of players in a competitive market. The exact opposite of such “selfish” equilibrium is the “altruistic” concept of the Berge equilibrium. At the moment, many works are devoted to a Berge equilibrium. However, all of these items are limited to purely theoretical issues, or, in general, to psychological applications. Papers devoted to the study of Berge equilibrium in economic problems were not seen until now. In this paper, the Berge equilibrium is considered in the Cournot oligopoly, and its relationship to the Nash equilibrium is studied. Cases are revealed in which players gain more profit by following the concept of the Berge equilibrium, then by using strategies dictated by the Nash equilibrium.
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