The Berg Letter: A Statement of Conscience, Not of Conviction

Abstract

ed from its context. When, during the years 1972 to 1974, the molecular biologists collectively raised the question of potential biohazard in their own work, it was a statement of conscience but not of conviction; much uncertainty but not deep concern. It is not really surprising that so contentious a group of individuals would come to such a self-threatening position. When concern over potential hazards derives from the results of basic research, it must come from an important if not a revolutionary finding. News of it will spread rapidly, be evaluated quickly, and lead to a general consensus. NORTON D. ZINDER, PH.D., is professor of genetics at the Rockefeller University in New York. Following just such a consensus, the open letter from the Berg Committee was published. In the recombinant DNA issue, it not only served to determine the tempo and direction of subsequent events but also notified the public of a possible problem. The letter was composed by seven, joined by four, and discussed widely prior to its publication. It gained wide approval, for the perceptions of potential biohazard that had disturbed a smaller community now similarly affected the larger one. Moreover, a course of action had been described that would protect the public, evaluate the hazard, and preserve the science. The Asilomar Conference and the NIH Guidelines were the first steps taken to accomplish these goals. Had the issue been left to evolve from this point, would have had a reasonable paradigm for dealing with other potential hazards. Unfortunately, two years after the initial recombinant DNA issue arose, a polemical debate began. Led by a few creditable scientists and joined by the environmentalists, a group attacked the Guidelines as at least inadequate, if not a sham. Accusations of meddling in the gene pool, in evolution, and in nature itself filled the air, while portentous questions of what we ought not to know were profferred. Governments at every level responded with hearings directed toward regulatory legislation. The molecular biologists, who by this time had changed their minds about the existence of potential hazards, managed to fend off most of the regulatory efforts, through a mixture of cogent argument and hard-boiled politics, quickly learned. The issue is fading away now, and with it the guidelines. The work proceeds safely, and its many promises are being rapidly fulfilled. Much of the difficulty that arises in dealing with potential hazard is intrinsic to the adjective potential. We were fated to be considered either too lax or too stringent in attempting to deal with the problem. It was difficult to defend the middle position, especially since it was continuously undergoing reevaluation. To determine the reality of the hazards required some experiments. Protecting the public required safety measures. Setting up such measures was taken to imply the reality of hazard. Thus many of the conservative steps taken to reassure only served to frighten. This reaction may be unavoidable. Still should have made a greater effort to explain that a potential hazard must be proven either actual or imaginary. There was a group committed to viewing every potential hazard as actual: the environmentalists. We did not attempt to meet with them early on. Perhaps it was arrogant, but I for one thought our moves toward self-regulation would meet with their favor. However when the arguments of the dissident scientists convinced them that were self-serving, their political savvy and access heightened the tensions and moved the issue into the political arena. Had thought of it, an early discussion with them might have proven useful but their later intransigence makes this by no means certain. During times of troubles it pays not to be distracted by extraneous issues. Two such issues were appended to our agenda: the aforementioned social concerns and the technical concern of E. coli as a host. Our most heinous crime was supporting the use of this human pathogen. Interestingly, Hastings Center Report, October 1980 In the Beginning, a Moratorium __