The Belgian Economic Elite and the Punishment of Economic Collaboration after the Second World War: Power and Legitimacy (1944-1952)

Abstract

Abstract Punishment of economic collaboration was a priority for the Belgian judiciary after the Second World War. This led to a confrontation with the Belgian economic elite: during the occupation they had organized themselves in the Galopin-committee. This informal committee, dominated by the leaders of holdings and banks, elaborated a code of conduct concerning production for Germany. In so doing, the committee assigned itself a political role. This code of conduct was more or less put into practice in the key sectors of the economy. The judiciary did not agree with the political role the economic elite had assigned itself nor with the interpretation of what could be considered as acceptable economic collaboration. Repression of economic collaboration became an issue of confrontation between the economic and judicial elite: even if ultimately only a few big entrepreneurs were punished, the traditional economic elite’s legitimacy was called into question. The elite’s position was, on the other hand, enhanced by the Belgian economy’s successful recovery after the liberation, which was combined with an increase in workers’ purchase power and the introduction of a social security system.