The behavior of financial analysts during the Asian financial crisis in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand

Abstract

This study investigates the behavior of a potentially influential class of market participants, the stock analysts, around the period of market crashes in four Asian countries. We find that analysts not only failed to anticipate the weaknesses in the firms they covered before the crash, they also failed to sufficiently adjust their forecasts after these markets crashed. Throughout the entire period of the study, the magnitudes of forecast errors were several times to that observed in the pre-crash period. However, we also do not find evidence of panic or herding on a large scale. Other issues investigated in this paper include the changes in coverage, changes in forecasts accuracy, the extent analysts agree and the patterns of their convergence for the sample. We also compare analyst forecasts for large versus small firms, and for high- versus low-growth/quality firms. A contribution to the literature is the cataloguing of models that may provide explanations for investors' expectations during a market crash.