The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks

Abstract

THE BATTLE FOR HEARTS AND MINDS: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks Edited by Alexander T. J. Lennon Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2003. xii, 392pp, US$25.oo paper (ISBN 0-262-62179-7)Since Joseph Nye coined the term some 15 years ago, soft power has been one of the most fashionable and most elusive terms in international politics. Nye has expended a great deal of ink and effort trying to clarify his original meaning, but, given how often the idea continues to be stretched and abused, one wonders whether he has succeeded. This book comes with Nye's imprimatur, which suggests that its plan to mobilize soft power against Islamism ought to be on the right track. It certainly is on the right track, but not far enough along that track to be of use to anyone but beginners in the field.Alexander Lennon, the editor-in-chief of The Washington Quarterly, assembled this collection from a series of articles published in his magazine between 2000 and 2003. Its 22 essays come from a commendably wide variety of contributors, ranging from Singaporean academics to former NSC officials to the current governor of Colorado. Lennon has divided them into three categories, one for each of the three tools-post-conflict reconstruction, public diplomacy, and foreign assistance-that it claims can reduce the threat of terrorism and convince the Muslim world to support American policies. Karin von Hippel's contribution on nation-building, for instance, offers a serviceable, if dry, history of recent attempts to get failing states back on their feet and nudge them towards democracy. Like the majority of the other essays, this is perfect fodder for international relations 101. It is basic, accessible, and uncontroversial. But 400 pages of elementary observations and middle-of-the road arguments leave one wondering how much use a book like this would be to the policymaker, presumably one of its main target audiences.Two premises underlie most of the authors' policy assumptions and recommendations. First, interests and values need not be at odds with one another. It makes both pragmatic and moral sense for the US to make a major effort to help rebuild states in the aftermath of war, not least because this will hinder al Qaeda's efforts to establish bases of operations there. The examples of Afghanistan and Sudan vividly illustrate the pitfalls of assuming that failed states pose no threat to American security. Second, soft power can do as much as, if not more than, military power to advance American goals. …