The Bases of Accommodation

Abstract

A VIABLE political settlement in South Viet Nam will re flect and give some legitimacy to the balance of political, ' military and social forces produced by a decade of internal conflict and five years of large-scale warfare. A successful settle ment can also inaugurate a process of political accommodation through which the various elements of Vietnamese society may eventually be brought together into a functioning polity. Amer ican objectives and American expectations of what can be achieved at the conference table and on the battlefield should, correspondingly, be based on the realities of power and the oppor tunities for accommodation. Much of the discussion of Viet Nam in the United States, how ever, has been couched in terms of stereotypes and slogans which have little relation to the political forces and social trends in Vietnamese society. Critics of the Administration often tend to glorify the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front and to magnify the extent of their support. They see the war as a popular uprising against a military-landlord oligarchy dependent upon foreign military support. Hence they see little need for, or basis for, accommodation: if the United States withdrew, it is held, the Saigon r?gime would quickly collapse, and a new, broadly representative government would come to power under the lead ership of the NLF but drawing support from Buddhists, workers, students and other groups. Spokesmen for the Administration, on the other hand, have in the past underrated the strength of the Viet Cong and have as cribed to the Saigon Government a popularity which had as little basis in fact as that which the critics attributed to the NLF. They have bolstered their case with statistics on kill rates, infiltration rates, chieu hoi (defection) rates, hamlet pacification categories and voting turnouts. These figures may be reasonably accurate but they are also often irrelevant to the conclusions which they are adduced to support. At times key figures in the Administra tion have made statements which at least seemed to predict the imminent collapse of the Viet Cong. The misplaced moralism of the critics has thus confronted the unwarranted optimism of the advocates.