The Bargaining and Contagion Effects of Investors in Single Family Residential Properties: The Case of Denver Colorado

Abstract

We study the bargaining power of investors and the contagion effects of investor-owned single family homes on nearby property values. By controlling for the characteristics of both buyers and sellers, we find that investors tend to have more bargaining power than owner-occupiers — they purchase at lower prices and sell at higher prices, all else equal. We identify two types of investors: Professional Investors (e.g., corporations and partnerships) and Individual Investors. We find differences in the behavior of these two types of investors. For example, Individual Investors tend to invest in homes similar in terms of unobserved quality to those purchased by owner-occupiers. The tendency to buy lower quality homes is primarily attributable to Professional Investors. We also find that Professional Investors have more bargaining power than Individual Investors. For the contagion analysis, we use a repeat sales methodology and find that increasing ownership by investors in a neighborhood is associated with a small positive effect on nearby property values.