The Bank of England and Parliament were monetarily adroit during the Napoleonic Wars

Abstract

With the connivance of Parliament, was the Bank of England's over issue of banknotes inflationary? The inflation stemmed from military subsidy and Peninsula campaign payments, as well as food imports, far in excess of Britain's export earnings to cover these capital transfers (particularly when crimped by the Continental Blockade), and not merely from domestic credit over issue. Neither domestic money creation nor the fiscal theory of the price level best explains the imbalance in Britain's international accounts during the Napoleonic Wars. This deficit stemmed from domestic production shortfalls in essentials (above all food production) and contractual obligations such as military spending/subsidies relative to the pound's international purchasing power which emanated from the ability of Britain to sell exports and replace imports with domestic output (raise food production internally). These types of highly inelastic transactions tended to operate independently of domestic money creation, fiscal policy (taxes) or price developments (inflation). This article tracks England's bullion debate, which concerned whether gold prices rose (and hence sterling's exchange rate fell) because military capital transfers overwhelmed the balance of payments, or because the Bank of England over issued paper money after the gold cover was removed in 1797. The issues herein are not antiquated because the primary issues in monetary debates for two centuries have concerned the cause of inflation and deflation, and whether the domestic money supply or the balance of payments is responsible. Determining actual causation is critical for the proper solution: monetary deflation, or domestic and international restructuring of trade and investment.