The Bahā'īs of Iran: the roots of controversy

Abstract

IN AN interview given shortly before his return to Iran in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini was asked about the position of religious minorities in a future Islamic republic. In his reply, he guaranteed protection and respect for such groups, but, when asked specifically about the largest of the minorities-the Bahi'as-he asserted that 'they are a political faction; they are harmful; they will not be accepted' (Seven Days 1979, pp.19-20; cf. Nash 1982, pp.77-78). That verdict has been matched during the past seven years by both organized and random campaigns against the Bah'is within Iran, which at times have reached the proportions of a full-scale pogrom but not, so far, those of the holocaust some writers have predicted (e.g. Nash 1982, pp.132, 136).1 Well over 100 Bah'as, including national and local leaders, have been put to death, both by execution and mob violence; hundreds of others have been imprisoned and, it is alleged, tortured; Bahai property has been seized, looted, and destroyed; the assets of Baha'l companies have been confiscated; and large numbers of adherents have been dismissed from private and public employment. According to a Minority Rights Group report: 'There is clear evidence that the authorities are condoning and in some cases initiating the terror and repression against Baha'is' (Cooper 1982, p.1 1). International opinion has been galvanized in support of the Baha'is to an unusual degree. Resolutions condemning the treatment of the minority have been passed by the UN Human Rights Sub-Commission and the SubCommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, the European Parliament, Amnesty International, and several national parliaments. Newspaper, radio, and even television publicity has been extensive, particularly at the local level, to the extent that, for many Westerners, the Iranian Baha'is may be the only Middle Eastern religious minority, besides Jews and Christians, of whose existence they are aware. There is, of course, a simple explanation for this unprecedented interest in the plight of a single minority. Outside Iran, the Baha'i community is sizeable and widely distributed, with perhaps 3,000,000 members worldwide (see Hampson 1980; MacEoin 1985b, pp.492-3). This international community possesses a highly organized and efficient bureaucratic structure that enables it to respond effectively to situations like the one in Iran. It is represented as a non-governmental body at the UN, with an office in New York, while national Baha'i organizations often have good relations with influential institutions and individuals in their countries. Baha' attitudes toward the current persecutions in Iran range from genuine concern for the plight of their co-religionists there to what seems uncomfortably like self-interested exploitation of the pogrom's publicity potential (as expressed, for example, in official statements to the effect that the Iranian situation offers 'golden opportunities' that may lead to 'large-scale conversion and an increasing prestige' (Universal House of Justice 1982; see also MacEoin 1983, f.n. 164)).