The avoidance of unwanted catch and cooperation: the case of the British Columbia groundfish trawl fishery

Abstract

AbstractThis paper focuses on a particularly successful avoidance of unwanted catch of protected, endangered, and threatened (PET) species in the form of ecologically important sponge and coral, to be found off Canada's Pacific coast. The fishery causing the unwanted catch—the British Columbia groundfish trawl fishery. A campaign to protect the sponge/coral led by environmental NGOs (ENGOs) resulted in the industry's access to the key California market being threatened. For reasons explained, the national resource manager's ability to take effective direct action had become severely compromised. The groundfish trawl fishing industry responded to the economic threat with a bottom up approach to the unwanted catch problem, by negotiating a habitat agreement with a consortium of ENGOs, with the blessing and full support of the national resource manager. The agreement, now in its tenth year of operation, has proved to be a remarkable success in avoidance of unwanted catch. The paper argues that the success rests fundamentally upon the fact that the fishers have been and are playing a stand alone stable cooperative game, which has led them in turn to play stable cooperative games with both the national resource manager and the ENGO consortium. The paper analyses the factors leading to the stand alone stable cooperative fisher game, doing so by necessity through the lens of game theory.