The audience effect and the role of deception in the expression of male mating preferences

Abstract

Males of several species have been shown to alter their mate preference in the presence of an eavesdropping rival. This evasive tactic has been interpreted as an attempt by the courting male to drive the attention of the rival away from the preferred female. The fitness return of this deceptive strategy will depend on the costs of cheating for the actor (the displayer) and the benefits for the rival (the bystander) of copying the choice of the displayer. We developed a two-person nonzero sum game between two males that compete for mating with one of two receptive females. Males could assess female quality with a varying level of uncertainty, which was modelled using a Bayesian statistical decision theory approach. We explored the actor and bystander payoffs under different levels of uncertainty in mate assessment and difference in quality between females. We found that when being eavesdropped on is costly (i.e. when females differ largely in quality), males are expected to cheat to reduce the amount of public information that is available to the unintended audience. However, under these circumstances, the value of the public information is low and the bystander is not expected to copy the choice of the actor. Our model suggests that deceptive male choice may evolve only under relatively restricted conditions and suggest that other explanations, such as, for example, a reduction in the risk of precopulatory male–male competition may be more likely. Future theoretical and empirical work will be necessary to test alternative interpretations of the audience effects in male mate choice.