The association between corporate governance and audit fees of bank holding companies

Abstract

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate whether corporate governance structures influence the audit process in terms of audit fee pricing for regulated companies.Design/methodology/approachThe paper first reviews prior literature and identifies factors within the categories of client size, audit risk, audit complexity, auditor‐related issues and corporate governance characteristics that are likely to influence audit fees of banking clients. It then regresses these variables on audit fees using an ordinary least square regression model for a sample of US listed bank holding companies (BHC).FindingsThe paper finds no significant association between most corporate governance variables and audit fees, suggesting that governance agents do not require additional assurance from the auditor, given close oversight by regulators. It also observes a negative association between audit committee independence and audit fees, implying that auditors reduce their effort and thus audit fees in the presence of an independent audit committee because they perceive that such committees reduce control and financial reporting risks.Originality/valueIn contrast with prior findings based on non‐regulated companies, governance agents in regulated companies such as BHC do not demand a more extensive audit. This reflects a substitution effect of regulatory oversight for internal governance monitoring. The paper also shows that BigN auditors modify their audit strategies in response to corporate governance mechanisms. Modifying audit strategies in accordance with the strength of governance mechanisms is consistent with recommendations in professional standards and would enable auditors to address risks more appropriately, thereby increasing audit quality and efficiency.