The association between belief in a just world and endorsing conspiracy theories is moderated by ambiguity tolerance, but not scientific reasoning

Abstract

Both the belief in a just world (BJW) and conspiracy theory (CT) endorsement assist people to make sense of their world when they encounter ambiguous situations. When one endorses BJW as a generalised framework for understanding their world, however, they may be less motivated to endorse more contextualised CTs. The present study tests this theoretical assertion and explores the extent to which ambiguity tolerance—a preference for black-and-white thinking—and scientific reasoning skills might modify the association. Findings indicate that people with low ambiguity tolerance and higher BJW were less likely to endorse CTs. However, when ambiguity tolerance is high, there was no such association. Scientific reasoning did not moderate the association between BJW and CT endorsement. This research provides support for the buffering effect of BJW against the endorsement of conspiracy theories when ambiguity tolerance is low and regardless of people's scientific reasoning abilities. We discuss the benefits of endorsing adaptive worldviews as a protective factor against engaging in more detrimental beliefs.