Abstract

The rather startling similarities in the controversies surrounding the insanity defense over several centuries (Golding & Roesch, 1987; Hans, 1986; Hermann, 1983a; Shah, 1986) underscore the transhistorical and deeply rooted problems involved in the development of a rational and coherent policy for adjudicating criminal non-responsibility on grounds of mental disorder. The importance of developing a clear and coherent set of social, legislative and clinical policies with respect to insanity acquittees, regardless of the statistical infrequency of the insanity verdict (Pasewark & McGinley, 1985), is made patently clear by the continuing legal, public, and scholarly controversy which surrounds the defense. Modern sentiments following John Hinckley’s acquittal by reason of insanity differ little from those of Queen Victoria, “We have seen the trials of Oxford and MacNaughten conducted by the ablest lawyers of the dayand they allow and advise the Jury to pronounce the verdict of not guilty on account of insanity, whilst everybody is morally convinced that both malefactors were perfectly conscious and aware of what they did” (cited in Walker, 1968, p. 168). It is quite clear that the bundle of problems surrounding the insanity defense and the disposition of insanity acquittees will remain a focal problem, whether or not one abolishes or modifies the plea.’ Until both social science researchers and political decision-makers, as well as the lay public, have available a longitu-

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