Abstract
This paper analyzes hypotheses and evidence for the causes of the Asian crises. It presents new evidence that, along with high rates of credit expansion and low ratios of international reserves to short-term debt, the combination of substantially appreciated currencies and large current account deficits played an important role in the crises' severity. Furthermore, the paper concludes that pre-crisis over-optimism rather than panic caused financial markets to behave imperfectly and that perverse financial liberalization and limited flexibility of exchange rates generated moral hazard problems of more importance than those generated by prospects of international bailouts.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
