The ASEAN Regional Forum:Building on Sand

Abstract

East Asia is not necessarily ripe for rivalry,(1) but neither is it secured for peace. Regional security cannot be built on muddled strategic thinking. The Regional Forum (ARF), composed of twenty-one foreign ministers who meet annually, and its associated processes, is trying to build on sand. The ARF can do little to help security in the wider Asia-Pacific region, and in some circumstances might work to undermine it. The ARF can do little to promote security because insists on its primacy in it, even though North Asia and not Southeast Asia is the locus of regional strategic tension. Southeast Asian countries quickly feel the ripple effects of changes in the relations among the great powers, but cannot set the security agenda for the major powers, nor reconcile differences among them. With equilibrium restored in Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Asia is now the global focus of unresolved great power strategic tension. Security in East Asia will revolve around the relations among the United States, Japan, China and Russia. China is East Asia's re-emerging great power, and regional security will depend in large part on the choice China makes, whether it chooses to integrate peacefully into a new regional order, or whether it opts to assert hegemony on the basis of size, centrality and history. Even in ASEAN's own front yard, the ARF has done nothing to improve security. Fuelled by a drive for power and resources, China's extensive territorial claims in the South China Sea are turned on and off at will.(2) They represent the greatest challenge to strategic stability in Southeast Asia. Four years after the ARF was formed, what is most striking is ASEAN's deepening disarray, and China's unremitting strategic pressure in the South China Sea. Consensual and procedural approaches along the lines of the ASEAN model simply cannot work if one party will not play. East Asia's economic crisis has also undermined the confidence of the states, as well as their defence purchasing power. The ARF risks undermining security because it distracts attention from the roots of strategic problems. Apart from problems on the Korean peninsula (which stem from the nature of the regime in Pyongyang), strategic tensions in East Asia have their origins in the nature of the regime in Beijing - its zero-sum view of power, its refusal to recognize the rights and interests of others, and its willingness to use force and threats in pursuit of its interests. The manifestations of strategic tension include the growing clash of interests between China and the United States over issues such as maritime passage in the South China Sea, and Taiwan's continued ability to resist enforced integration with China. By bringing Sino-U.S. rivalry to the table, the ARF has given China the opportunity to play the multipolarity card against the United States, thus diverting attention from the sources of strategic tension. China has been using multilateralist approaches as a way of undermining U.S. alliances in Asia, and playing on anti-Western sentiment arising from East Asia's economic crisis. The states have already signalled capitulation on the Taiwan issue. But is it not the case that jaw-jaw is always better than war-war? Supporters of the ARF claim that process is important, and that the ARF will help to draw China into co-operative relations with its neighbours. Those hopes are best vested in the region-wide trade and economic group, APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation). APEC can encourage China to behave according to the dictates of enlightened self-interest. China needs markets and capital. APEC will draw China further into the sticky web of capitalism, where the market and information technology may act as solvents of tyranny. But this approach is not guaranteed to work. China is hoping to enjoy the benefits of the market while retaining political control. It also seems bent on developing the sinews of war rich country, strong army. …