Abstract
In 1873, Nietzsche claimed that a generally and uniformly valid designation is invented for things. This designation has normative force: as a matter of fact, the «linguistic» legislation dominating the practice of language establishes the first laws of truth (On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense). In other words, for Nietzsche the artificial nature of truth, given the artificial nature of language itself, was out of discussion. In this paper, I approach the contemporary debate on post-truth by juxtaposing it with the idea of «artificial» or «conventional» truth typical of legal discourse and by showing the aporia behind each search for truth. In order to do so, I focus on the specific nature of «legal» truth and I invite to consider the centrality of the performative force of truth-making procedures – crucial for lawyers and legal practice – in order to underline the importance played by technology in the construction of truth also in the political discourse.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
