The art of political ambiguity: top–down intergovernmental information asymmetry in China

Abstract

China, similar to other countries with multi-level government structure, suffers serious information asymmetry between different levels of governments. Existing studies mostly focus on how the secret information possessed by lower-level governments undermines effective control by upper-level governments. However, not enough attention has been paid to the fact that higher authorities in China often intentionally issue ambivalent orders and withhold crucial information about policy goals and means from their subordinates. In face of such top–down information asymmetry, lower-level governments have to constantly speculate the true intentions of their superiors when implementing directives from above. This study tries to make sense of the seemingly counterproductive political ambiguity by analyzing cases of intergovernmental communication and policy implementation in the campaign of New Socialist Countryside Construction. We argue that higher authorities in China may strategically deploy political ambiguity to enable flexible policy implementation, encourage policy innovation, orient local efforts among multiple policy goals, and reduce accountability for policy failures. Essentially, political ambiguity enhances the adaptability and resilience of the Chinese political system in governing the vastly diverse and rapidly developing country of China.