The Art of Command in the Civil War.

Abstract

The Art of Command in the Civil War. Edited by Steven E. Woodworth. (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, c. 1998. Pp. xiv, 193. $39.95, ISBN 0-8032-4785-0.) Steven E. Woodworth introduces this collection of essays by mentioning the all-too-obvious yet often ignored pitfall that frequently plagues historians' analyses of military campaigns. Our opinions of commanders, while rightly based on an evaluation of their deeds, sometimes fail to fully consider that the commanders' decisions and their subsequent actions were often based on information far more scanty than theft available to us. Battles are not games, he asserts, and we must consider not only the impact of the fog of war but also host of other factors that commanders must address and overcome. Several of the issues that drive command decisions both directly and indirectly are explored in this series of essays. Collectively they illustrate that the art of command involves a vastly more complicated and interesting process than game of chess (p. x). That point defines the theme binding these works into cohesive whole, and it would be well for readers to recall it periodically as they make their way though the book. The minutiae of some essays at times make them appear to be somewhat distantly related to Woodworth's general thesis. This is flaw--if it may be called such--inherent in most collections of this type. That being said, the book is nonetheless fine compilation of well-written and thoroughly researched material on the subject of command. Craig L. Symonds opens the series with look at how internal politics hampered Joseph E. Johnston's effectiveness as field commander. Johnston's relationship with President Jefferson Davis was poisoned by the general's relationship with Davis's political archenemy, Louis T. Wigfall. Symonds speculates that Johnston failed to receive Davis's full support in 1864 as result of dual handicaps. First was his previously unremarkable record as field commander, and second was his questionable association with Wigfall (p. 13). William B. Feis next makes strong contribution to our of the way in which accurate and effectively analyzed intelligence data played role in the making of command decisions. He describes Ulysses S. Grant's debut as combat commander at Belmont, Missouri, as being driven logically and inexorably by the information that he accumulated and analyzed in the two months preceding the battle. Later in this collection Grant again comes under scrutiny, this time by Brooks D. Simpson. His essay on Grant's problems as general in chief begins by suggesting new way to view the general's relationship with his president. Eschewing the T. Harry Williams version of Lincoln as skilled strategist (Lincoln and His Generals [New York, 1952]), Simpson contends instead that it was Grant's understanding and acceptance of political that made all the difference (p. 138). Simpson goes on to describe the patient means by which Grant was able to balance those constraints with military necessity until such time as he was able to have his way. …