The Army’s Dilemma

Abstract

Given its performance in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army's stock should be at an all-time high. It carried out a bold plan that was both operationally and logistically challenging against a larger if unmotivated force. It routed the Iraqi army and adapted well to the unexpected attacks by the fedayeen. It also fought well in the cities, often a killing field for attackers. It took few casualties, just over 100 dead before the declared end of hostilities. More impressively, it reversed the historical ratio of battle to non-battle injuries. Typically, the latter outnumber the former significantly, but in Iraq non-battle deaths were about one-third of those caused by combat. (1) Few non-battle injuries are widely seen as a characteristic of a well-trained and disciplined force. By any measure, the Army performed superbly. Additionally, the Army has embarked on what is arguably the most dramatic and radical transformation of any of the services. The current Army plan calls for a dramatic shift away from heavy armor to a family of 16 to 20-ton vehicles that will rely heavily on a networked system of information and situational awareness for battlefield success as opposed to heavy armor plate. The Army's rapid deployment goals are truly daunting (a brigade-sized force anywhere in the world in 96 hours, followed by the rest of a division by 120 hours). These ambitious goals are taxing all aspects of the Army's combat and support organizations to streamline to an unprecedented degree to even come close to meeting those timelines. How is it, then, that according to many reports the Army is perceived by senior defense policymakers as unimaginative, obstructionist, and wedded to concepts of warfare that are increasingly irrelevant to the current geopolitical environment? The Army's diminished status reflects in the filling of high-level joint billets by officers from the other services, including the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, which had been held by an Army officer for more than 40 years. (2) This article suggests an explanation for this perception and ways the Army might alter it. How the Army Sees Itself The Army has long seen itself as the service, the one with the primary responsibility to win the nation's wars. Indeed, the Army's vision statement describes fighting and winning our nation's as its nonnegotiable contract with the American people. (3) It does not qualify the vision by indicating that it wins the wars in conjunction with the other services. This view finds more formal expression in Field Manual 3-0, Operations, the Army's capstone doctrinal manual: Land operations determine the outcome of major theater wars (MTWs). In an MTW, the nation employs large joint and multinational forces in major combat operations to defeat an enemy nation, coalition, or alliance. The Gulf War of 1991 is an example of an MTW. Army forces are the decisive forces for sustained land combat, war termination, and postwar stability. JFCs [joint force commanders] normally designate the land component as the supported force during those phases of a campaign. (4) The logic is clear: land operations are decisive in major theater wars, and Army forces are the decisive ones in land combat. Cast as a syllogism, it would read as follows: * Major premise: Land operations determine the outcome of major theater wars. * Minor premise: Army forces determine the outcome of land operations. * Conclusion: Army forces determine the outcome of major theater wars. The logic is impeccable. But as with all syllogisms, the validity hinges on the major and minor premises. This view has important implications. Chief among them is that the Army, a believer in joint operations, perceives the role of the other services as being, fundamentally, to support the Army. The Air Force and Navy get the Army to the theater and provide it such important combat support as naval gunfire, interdiction, and close air support. …