The Army and Politics in France

Abstract

I N JUNE 1960 THE ALGERIAN wAR seemed to enter a new phase. General de Gaulle declared that the French were prepared to discuss with the leaders of the insurrection an honorable end to the fighting, which would include guaranties conceming the destination of arms and the fate of the combatants. The Provisional Government of the Republic (GPRA) despatched two emissaries to France to make the necessary arrangements for a meeting between Ferhat Abbas and General de Gaulle. The conversations, which took place at Melun from June 25th through 29th, resulted in an impasse. The GPRA declared inopportune further negotiations on the basis of the conditions (involving mainly limitations on the movements of their delegates) laid down by the French. Even if agreement had been reached on procedure, freedom of maneuver on both sides was severely restricted. The activists among the rebels insist on independence (or a settlement of the war which will guarantee that outcome), while the French government envisages a referendum which will lead the people (under the prodding of the Army and the administration) to prefer a close association between Algerian Algeria and France. It appears doubtful that either the French government or the GPRA can impose a compromise solution upon their respective armed forces. In theory, as General de Gaulle observes in his memoirs, Armies exist to serve the policy of states. Yet, little more than a year after his inauguration as President of the Republic, General de Gaulle donned his uniform, addressed the nation on radio and television, and denounced those elements of the Army who think that they have a right to a policy which would not be France's policy.