The Arms Trade: No Cause for a Treaty

Abstract

The United States has a very developed arms export regime that controls U.S. sales to foreign states as well as U.S. companies’ sales to foreign states. Furthermore, the U.S. actively promotes the development of similar regimes in other states through a voluntary agreement designed to improve practices as well as regional agreements. Despite the existence of regional arms control agreements, several states, scholars, and NGOs have pushed for an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Such a treaty, proponents argue, could help reduce the amount of exported arms used to commit human rights abuses and other violations of international law. Yet, at the same time, one might doubt the strong necessity for a grand UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty (planned for 2012) and an accompanying treaty that might do little to address the most severe problems of arms transfer. Control Arms Campaign, a strong proponent of the ATT, completed a study chronicling the movement of arms in ways that evade domestic and regional arms control policies. It is unclear whether the proposed ATT would address many of the common evasion practices. Another strong concern is the “re-export” or “retransfer” of arms to a third party even after a legal sale (under domestic and/or international law) is made to a main party. This paper will explore the extent to which current arms trade treaties, as well as the proposed ATT, address the most prevalent challenges in controlling the arms trade. Part II will briefly review the existing state of the global arms trade and then examine current international, regional, and state practices on arms control of conventional weaponry. Part III will analyze the developments toward an Arms Trade Treaty, hypothesize the form such a treaty might take, and assess the likely impact of an ATT on the arms trade. I will suggest that, while the ideal is noble, the proposed ATT does not appear to go much further than existing agreements in curbing the multi-billion dollar arms trade. While the ATT may bring more structure and mandatory reporting to such existing regimes as the Wassenaar Arrangement, the ATT would likely be joined mostly by those states that already have robust arms control regimes. There do not appear to be great incentives to states that currently remain indifferent to the negative consequences of arms flow to corrupt leaders, criminals, and terrorists. Ultimately, an ATT would not appear to have the ability to overhaul the existing practices in arms export throughout the world. Furthermore, although one could certainly approach the potential treaty by analyzing the political realities of ratification – e.g. substantial domestic opposition within the U.S. to ratification – such analysis is outside the scope of this paper. Rather, this paper will limit itself to analysis of the merits of the ATT and how it would affect the arms trade even without substantial ratification issues in such major arms exporters as the U.S., Russia, and China.