Abstract
AbstractThis chapter covers the core arguments for the powers ontology. The first style of argument appeals to science. Some argue, for example, that, at the fundamental level, science discovers nothing but dispositional properties. The chapter argues that such appeals are unconvincing, for it might be in the nature of science to posit only dispositional qualities for whatever particles it is currently treating as fundamental. Other arguments are metaphysical, and suggest that a regress threatens if we fail to posit irreducibly dispositional properties. The chapter uses the failure of some of these arguments to help select the best ontology for a powers theorist. The chapter concludes by arguing that the powers theorist is best served by rejecting pan-dispositionalism and embracing an ontology that includes both powers and categorical properties.
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