The Archaeologist Was a Spy: Sylvanus G. Morley and the Office of Naval Intelligence

Abstract

Here is an interesting page-turner concerning a leading Maya scholar who became a spook. Based on materials from the Public Records Office, U.S. Navy Archives, and various Federal Records centers, the authors assert that Sylvanus Morley was “the finest U.S. spy of World War I” (p. xiii).The book’s thesis emphasizes the U.S. response to a German plan to establish two submarine bases somewhere along the Mesoamerican coast. Morley’s task was to establish whether any bases existed. Harris and Sadler provide a good sketch of Morley, who approached the Office of Naval Intelligence in March 1917 to become one of their agents. Despite his interest in the pre-Hispanic indigenous civilizations of Mesoamerica, Morley was an imperialist who believed that the United States had the right to intervene in Central America in case nationalization of industries or domestic conflicts threatened U.S. interests. A determined patriot, Morley explored the rivers, bays, bayous, and swamps of Central America systematically, taking soundings as he and his crew of five other archaeologists went along. Meanwhile, Morley noted that anti-U.S. sentiment was rampant throughout the region.The material on the Yucatán is the most interesting part of the book. Morley noted that the Caste War of 1847 still continued: some five to ten thousand Santa Cruz rebels controlled of most of Quintana Roo territory, and they enjoyed friendly relations with British Honduras officials (so amicable that they requested London to annex the Santa Cruz domain into the British Empire). Mexican president Venustiano Carranza supposedly feared that Britain would seize Quintana Roo by attacking from Honduras, while Morley claimed that Belize fretted about a Mexi-can attack from the Yucatán. Some of Morley’s conclusions are questionable at best.Morley’s highly dubious report concludes that the Yucatán would declare its independence in the event of an all-out war with the United States and “place itself under our protection” (p. 240). Morley also raised the possibility that the Yucatán might prefer U.S. intervention. Because of a purported drop in henequen production, Morley surmised that a U.S. takeover would become necessary for wartime purposes. Moreover, the claim is made that Yucatecan peons had no use for governor Salvador Alvarado because of his anticlerical policies as well as high levels of inflation. Morley even went so far as to recommend that Central America and Mexico be made into U.S. protectorates because of their “despotism and revolution” (p. 289).The authors raise the ethical question of spying while posing as a researcher. Franz Boas leveled harsh criticism against fellow anthropologists spying in various countries under the cloak of science. It is difficult not to side with Boas, as Morley and his companions cynically took advantage of their various hosts. Yucatecan authorities, for example, went out of their way to entertain Morley and facilitate his access to archaeological sites. Even after World War I concluded, Morley continued to spy on El Salvador, which maintained its anti-U.S. stance.This book is mostly a biography of Morley, rather than a history of espionage or counterintelligence. The authors consulted only one Mexican archival source (Condumex), which is curious. Failing to check the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteri-ores folders, for example, presents an incomplete picture. Nor are archival consultations mentioned for other Central American countries or Germany repositories. The venerable 812 U.S. State Department collection, which contains many discussions of German submarine bases, was not consulted, and the authors ignore Ray Gerhard’s 1970 dissertation, which examines German activities thoroughly. Finally, the authors’ use of relevant secondary sources, such as studies by myself, Michael Smith, and Joseph Stout, is inadequate (even though I shared a few drinks with the authors back in the late 1970s). My only other criticism is that Harris and Sadler accept many of Morley’s conclusions a bit too readily and praise him excessively. It is hard to imagine, for example, that Morley was really the best U.S. agent during World War I, given some of his mistakes and his bellicose observations. Britain also made extensive use of explorers and archaeologists, but this is not mentioned.These caveats aside, The Archaeologist was a Spy has many virtues. It contains compelling portraits of the interesting people around Morley and good discussions of Mesoamerican leaders and political disputes. The University of New Mexico Press provided excellent illustrations and maps, and the endnotes are detailed and illuminating. All told, it makes for very interesting as well as pleasant reading. The authors place Morley’s mission within the broader contest of Wilson’s Latin American strategy, helping to fill an important gap in the history of U.S. intelligence.