Abstract

As of 2022, mankind has been struggling with the COVID-19 pandemic for three years. This paper is based on the application of game theory in natural disaster prevention and control. Using a case study approach, the paper specifically examines the game process between policy makers (states), policy transmitters (hospitals) and policy implementers (individuals) in the prevention and control of the pandemic, as well as the answers to three questions: why governments have coercive measures, how hospital decisions at the beginning of the pandemic caused the spread of the coronavirus, and the impact of uneven control efforts between countries. It is found that from the individual perspective, which can include individuals in the pandemic prevention and control or a particular hospital in the healthcare system, the rational choice of interest of the individual is inconsistent with the rational choice of interest of the whole and a Nash equilibrium is thus reached. From a national perspective, in a world of countries experiencing progressively globalized and integrated, the unevenness of control efforts has led to the fact that no country can be left alone, thereby imported COVID-19 cases are always present. This is also reflected in whether or not to collaborate on vaccine development.

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