Abstract
This article analyses the vexed question of the Austro-German Anschluss in the context of fascist Italian defence policy during the critical period between 1933 and late 1937. It argues that although Benito Mussolini viewed the Nazi regime as a potential alliance partner long before Italy signed the Pact of Steel in May 1939, he mistrusted Hitler profoundly. This was especially the case over the Anschluss question, which, had it occurred during the course of the fascist assault on Ethiopia (1935-36), would have generated considerable internal alarm and threatened Mussolini's political authority. The essay argues that only with Ethiopia conquered, and the Axis relationship a prominent feature of fascist policy, was it possible for Mussolini to consider Italian accession to a full Austro-German union. At that point military planning and intelligence work no longer considered the likelihood of an Italo-German armed clash over Austria.
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