The Anatomy of Fascism by Robert O. s> Paxton (review)

Abstract

770 SEER, 84, 4, 2006 Perhaps the answer is 'yes', and that was his tragedy. Nevertheless, you can see from this ground-breakingstudywhy Stalinfound him such a reliablepair of hands. School ofHistory PHILIP BOOBBYER UniversitofKent Paxton, Robert 0. The Anatomyof Fascism.Penguin Books, London and New York, 2004. xii + 32I pp. Notes. Bibliographalessay. Index. C8.99 (paperback). IN this survey of fascism, Robert Paxton rejects the concept of the 'fascist minimum' which seeks to understandthe fascistphenomenon througha general but concise definition. Paxton argues that the ideal type creates a 'static picture of somethingbetterperceivedin movement' (p. I4)and tells us little of how fascismwon and retainedpower. Since fascismprided itselfon being an ideology of action ratherthan of philosophy,Paxton'sargumentwould, on the face of it, appear to be convincing. Rather than accepting fascistrhetoric at face value, therefore, Paxton argues in favour of observing 'fascismin action [.. .] within the complex web of interactionsit formswith society' (p. 22). He sets out to examine fascismas a phenomenon in five stages:i) the creation of movements; 2) their rooting in the political system; 3) the seizure of power; 4) the exercise of power; and 5) the longer term in which fascism either radicalizedor succumbed to entropy. The problemwith Paxton'sfive-stagemodel, however, is that, as he himself admits, most fascistmovements did not complete the five stages. Indeed, the vast majoritydid not get beyond stageone. This inevitablymeans that most of the book deals with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. In examining these, Paxton stresseshow electoral participationand the prospect of power forced Mussolini and Hitler to eschew the radicalrhetoric of their respectivemovements so as to appeal to a wider electorateand to potentialcoalitionpartners. In so doing they rejectedmuch of the anti-capitalistrhetoricof the earlyyears in order to cooperate with business interests and 'bourgeois' party leaders. Their success,Paxton argues,lay in their abilityto transformtheirmovements into catch-all parties. Paxton emphasizesthe importanceof understandingthe motivationsof liberal and conservativepoliticiansand elites in helping to bring both Mussolini and Hitler to power. 'One of the most importantpreconditions', he argues, 'was a falteringliberalorder. Fascismgrew from the back rooms to the public arena most easily where the existing government functioned badly, or not at all' (p. 77). In this context 'it is essential to recall how real the possibility of communist revolution seemed in Italy in 192I and in Germany in I932' (P. IO5).It was the apparentinabilityof the democratic governmentsto solve such problems, includingthe impact of the Great Depression, which gave the movements their opening. Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were inevitably, as a result of their compromised paths to power (and Paxton rightly notes that neither regime was ever fullyendorsedby the electorate),in a permanentstate of tension between REVIEWS 77I party radicalsand more conservativeforces. Most notably, the formeratheist and republican, Mussolini, was forced to compromise with the church and monarchy. Fascistradicalismwas ultimatelysaved by recourseto war for both Fascistsand Nazis. Perhaps Paxton is, however, a little too hasty in rejecting the fascistpotential for revolutionoutsidethe war theatre.While it is truethat fascism 'never dreamed of abolishing property' (p. 142), fascistscertainly set out to abolish social hierarchybased upon traditionalelites or social classes. The fascistleadershipprinciple may have reinforcedhierarchy,but certainly not that which traditional conservatives would have felt comfortable with. Had the Third Reich and its allies won the Second World War, there is no reason to doubt that the SS, based upon the concept of the raciallysuperior 'New Man', would have supplanted the aristocracyand traditionalelites in their entirety. A successful war would also have reinforced the position of fascistmilitantsin Italy. It is a pity that the Gombos regime in Hungary and the Romanian National Legionary State do not receive more than brief mentions in the book. Both representcases of fascistsin power and might have broadenedout the scope of Paxton's work. Gombos, like Mussolini and Hitler, was brought to power in I932 by essentiallyconservativeforces, in this case the Regent, Admiral Horthy, and former minister president Count Bethlen as the economic depression deepened. Horthy and Bethlen hoped that the fascist Gombos, who had stronginfluenceamongstthe impoverishedmembersof the bureaucracy and army, would be discredited by the sheer enormity of Hungary's economic problems. In gaining power as minister president, Gombos was forcedby Horthy and Bethlentojettison his plans for antisemitic legislation and...