Abstract

James Buchanan pioneered constitutional political economy, especially in The Calculus of Consent (with Gordon Tullock) and The Limits of Liberty. While he briefly considered private clubs and associations, he mostly limited his analysis to the traditional state. However, privately governed proprietary communities are capable of providing most public goods and internalizing most externalities. We argue that such proprietary communities offer a viable and feasible means for implementing a non-state-based constitutional political economy which satisfies Buchanan's own standards. The state is not necessary to accomplish Buchanan's goals, and Buchanan's works carry unrecognized anarchist implications.

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