The American‐Israeli security treaty: sequel or means to the relief of Israeli‐Arab tensions, 1954–55

Abstract

Israel's security concept in the aftermath of the first Arab-Israeli war consisted of two basic levels. At one level the primary influence was the history of the Jewish-Arab conflict, and more particularly the events of the 1948 war. Under their impact, the Israeli leadership concluded that the fledgling state still faced an existential threat: the Arab states had still not accepted Israel as a fact in the region and were waiting for an opportunity to destroy it.1 At the other level, Israel's strategic situation was evaluated in concrete terms. From the signing of the armistice agreements in 1949 until the mid-1950s, the assessment was that there was no imminent danger of war.2 These appraisals were reflected in the organization of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) following the war. The armed forces were considerably scaled down and the high command turned to the task of building military structures appropriate for a period of peace, trimming manpower and eliminating certain units.3 During this period the IDF coped with continuing security problems in three main sectors: Syria, Jordan and Egypt. However, this did not alter the basic assessment on the improbability of a war. Until a certain point the struggle for control in the demilitarized zones in the Syria and Sinai border sectors, and the fight which went on throughout the period against infiltrations from Jordan, Egypt and the Gaza Strip were perceived as having a local character and not necessarily related to the larger Arab-Israeli picture. The two-track security conception affected the reaction of Israel's defence leadership to the evolving relationships between the Arab states and two Great Powers, Britain and the United States. In the years following the Second World War, Washington paid little attention to the Middle East. In the emerging reality of the Cold War, America considered the region of secondary importance to its strategic interests. Ideas such as the incorporation of the Middle Eastern states in NATO, or the establishment of a regional defence organization with or without Great Power involvement, taking advantage of existing alliances, were rejected by the State Department. It was only after the outbreak of the Korean War (June 1950)