The "American Creed" and American Identity: the Limits of Liberal Citizenship in the United States

Abstract

IN 1915, President Woodrow Wilson told group of newly naturalized citizens that they had just sworn allegiance no one, only to a great ideal, to great body of principles, to great hope of the human race (Harrington 1980: 678). The view of citizenship Wilson thus expressed has distinguished historic lineage, recently reaffirmed by Samuel P. Huntington. In Politics: The Promise of Disharmony, he maintains that for most nations, identity is the product of long process of historical evolution involving common ancestors, common experiences, common ethnic background, common language, common culture, and usually common religion.' But citing an impressive list of authorities, Huntington argues that the United States is different. civic identity has been based on ideas, on shared allegiance to the American Creed of liberal democracy (Huntington 1981: 23). Huntington, like most of his authorities, also implies that this is more or less the way it should be.2 He believes that whenever the United States becomes severely divided, the nation's liberal democratic ideals serve to restore unity more inclusively than focus on common ancestors, language, or religion would permit (1981: 230-31). Many past and present critics of liberalism agree with Huntington that political culture is overwhelmingly liberal, but they dispute his normative judgment. They contend that public philosophy and public law which strive to rest national political identity simply on acceptance of liberal principles reflect thin, one-sided conception of the human personality. Liberal pol-