The airfare pricing and seat allocation problem in full-service carriers and subsidiary low-cost carriers

Abstract

This study investigates the competitive market situation in the air transport industry considering full-service carriers (FSC), subsidiary low-cost carriers (LCC) and rival LCCs on the flight-leg level while subsidiary LCCs are established by FSCs against rival LCCs to keep the market share and to make more profit. It is assumed that the demand of economy class for each airline follows a known distribution, and the mean value of that distribution is a function of its airfare and the airfare differences with other airlines. In addition, no-shows and cancellations are introduced to reflect a real situation. Based on this situation, a mathematical model is developed to derive efficient airfare pricing and seat allocation for each airline for maximizing the profit sum of both FSCs and subsidiary LCCs using a repeated game. A repeated game model integrated with a Tabu search algorithm and an EMSR based heuristic is suggested to deal with the proposed repeated game. A numerical example is provided to validate the model and solution procedure with hypothetical system parameter values under two kinds of market situations that show before and after the emergence of subsidiary LCCs.